Strategies
for Outsourcing Chemical and Wastewater Management
by Anders E. Stenstedt, Esq., Morrison & Foerster
LLP
KEY ELEMENTS AND BENEFITS OF OUTSOURCING
Successfully outsourcing chemical and wastewater management
services (CWMS) involves balancing three key elements. Each
of these elements must be addressed in carefully structured
contracts negotiated among the manufacturing entity and
service providers. These elements are: (1) transforming
the chemical supply chain and replacing or insulating existing
suppliers from their traditional roles as commodity sellers;
(2) outsourcing, to the extent possible, water, wastewater,
solid waste and recycling systems, to relieve the manufacturer
of a non-core business and allocate risk and responsibility
to more technically competent experts; and (3) aligning
motivations of manufacturer and service provider to reduce
costs and consumption, thereby optimizing efficiency, performance
and safety. The contractual relationships governing CWMS
must provide for each of these three components if such
outsourcing is to achieve the goals of reduced costs and
improved performance.
In the standard chemical supply chain, neither manufacturer
nor chemical supplier is properly motivated to reduce chemical
usage. Although manufacturer may pursue such strategy if
it leads directly to cost controls, performance improvements
or greater efficiency, without more, supplier cannot benefit
from this approach and therefore will not support such efforts.
To transform this dynamic, chemical suppliers must break
from their traditional product-sales and product-servicing
role and diversify as more integrated service providers.
As integrated service providers, chemical suppliers could
encourage CWMS users to purchase lower volumes of chemical
materials to produce more efficient usage and supply chain
management. The innovative supplier can thereby replace
commodity sales revenue with fees for management services
and technical expertise to benefit directly from this transformation.
However, this change in suppliers’ orientation is
not easily accomplished when chemical suppliers are economically
motivated to promote increased sales of product and naturally
averse to incurring new risks of environmental liability
and employee transfers. Accordingly, a neutral third-party,
nonprofit organization like Chemical Strategies Partnership
(CSP) (http://www.chemicalstrategies.org/) can greatly enhance
the argument for CWMS by specifying how chemical suppliers
may convert and diversify their expertise to benefit from
decreased consumption of chemicals by manufacturers (adding
value to manufacturer’s production process).
Fortunately, as CSP demonstrates, the innovative manufacturer
profits from CWMS by helping the manufacturer reduce chemical
usage, but also by reducing chemical waste and limiting
handling risk. In addition, CWMS can improve overall operating
performance when more efficient chemical usage and system
improvements introduced by the creative chemical supplier
are integrated into other parts of the manufacturing process.
A technically competent and diversified supplier who is
prepared to diversify and sell services along with chemical
materials can reap such tangible economic benefits. Finally,
the overall reduction of chemical waste and mitigation of
associated risks benefits the environment, and therefore
provides additional intangible social and marketing benefits
for both manufacturer and supplier.
Successful outsourcing of CWMS relieves the manufacturer
of peripheral business activities that detract from the
manufacturer’s ability to perform its basic manufacturing
process. This may involve only incremental parts of the
overall manufacturing process, but can effect a transfer
of significant responsibility for a sensitive and costly
part of the manufacturing process. The optimal allocation
between manufacturer and service provider places risk and
responsibility on the party who is most capable of managing
such risk, however, service provider must now be compensated
for such risk, and manufacturer must therefore understand
the true cost of carrying the risk today to justify such
expense. In one extreme, manufacturer may desire to make
a complete transfer of responsibility from the manufacturer
to a more competent technical supplier. On the other hand,
parties must recognize and accept the challenge of transferring
total responsibility along with risk in a short period of
time. This may lead to a partial or gradual transfer of
risk to supplier, with manufacturer retaining any risk of
failure attributable to pre-existing conditions broadly
defined.
The potentially difficult challenge of transferring risk
to the service provider can be mitigated by a gradual transfer
of responsibility, by use of third party insurance and recognition
of pre-existing liabilities. Contractual responsibility
or complete risk of failure can be further limited because
the manufacturer retains title to any waste product released
from the facility and the manufacturer remains primarily
obligated on all governmental permits and for any spill
or release to the environment attributable to such broadly
defined pre-existing conditions. In addition, the parties
can make advantageous use of any available insurance to
further limit the risks of liability. In the process of
drafting and carefully negotiating contracts that (i) limit
the initial scope of work to be done by the manufacturer,
(ii) specify ongoing obligations of the service provider,
(iii) include a generous definition of pre-existing conditions,
and (iv) recognize the legal and practical limitations of
transferring liability for spills or releases of hazardous
chemicals into the environment and for third party claims,
both parties may learn more about the scope of existing
risks. With a better understanding of existing risks, and
a trial period of services or consulting on limited projects,
the parties develop a working relationship that supports
a process of specifying further tasks toward a goal of effecting
a comprehensive transfer.
The incremental benefits of reducing costs of chemical
materials purchased may justify the trial period or gradual
transfer, and thereby allow for the expanding opportunities
of a comprehensive CWMS. This cost reduction usually comes
from service provider’s economies of scale, exercising
its broader purchasing power and expertise in procurement
management over a specified range of chemical products and
gases, which can be demonstrated by CSP, for example. The
service provider may then offer further economic benefits
to the manufacturer by providing chemical management and
wastewater treatment on an expanding scale.
CONTRACTING TO SUCCESSFULLY OUTSOURCE CWMS
A successful CWMS contract requires a workable system of
sharing information between the manufacturer and an integrated
service and product supplier. This means exchanging potentially
sensitive information about the existing manufacturing process,
including baseline cost structures, chemical compositions
and consumption statistics, together with other proprietary
information or trade secret technology. Accordingly, a first
step in developing any contractual relationship is to define
the terms of confidentiality in a non-disclosure agreement
(NDA). The terms of confidentiality can be further refined
within a negotiated CWMS contract to continue the process
of sharing such competitive information, accommodating the
expansion of an incremental agreement as discussed above,
and allowing the service provider to better understand and
participate in the overall manufacturing business.
There are several steps to create binding legal obligations
in the outsourcing of CWMS. After the NDA, manufacturers
and service providers may use a letter of intent (LOI) or
memorandum of understanding (MOU) to outline the general
terms of a proposed transaction. The initial contracts may
then evolve into a more formal request for proposal (RFP),
with a form of CWMS contract attached as part of the RFP,
leading to final contract negotiations. Each of these steps
provides an opportunity for the parties to share information
about each party’s goals, including objectives and
limitations, together with technical information and some
indication of the manufacturer’s employees likely
to be transferred under CWMS. Creating legal obligations
carefully and systematically by increments allows the parties
to establish a process of communication and trust, creating
a binding contract entered into with planning, due diligence
and balanced negotiations.
Each LOI, MOU and RFP is unique and subject to the circumstances
of particular negotiations. These documents are not prone
to any definitive form or characterization of the legal
relations created thereby. The LOI and MOU usually contain
a statement that denies any binding contractual obligation
by signature thereon, deferring to a process of due diligence
and further negotiation before legal obligations exist by
signed, definitive documentation. Conversely, the LOI and
MOU may create binding legal contracts, commonly limited
to issues like confidentiality, responsibility for fees,
and requirements to cooperate, deliver documents and allow
inspections, but possibly more. The manufacturer and service
provider should therefore work closely with experienced
legal counsel to manage the process of contract formation
and to ensure a balanced approach to achieving their respective
needs.
SOME CONTRACTING ISSUES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
Statement of Work, Pricing, and Performance. Within
the CWMS contract, there are certain, potentially contentious
areas warranting special attention. First and foremost,
as discussed above, the statement of work and pricing must
reflect the manufacturer’s realistic objectives and
compensate the service provider for its technical competence
and any true risk allocated to the service provider. This
transfer of risk may include environmental risk as discussed
above, and also risks related to managing employees transferred
from manufacturer to service provider as part of the CWMS.
To outsource CWMS, the manufacturer must establish an objective
system to measure a contractor’s performance and properly
motivate contractor to accomplish the stated goals of reducing
costs and consumption, and optimizing efficiency, performance
and safety. Such a system also involves sharing of computer
tracking data to eliminate inventory and correct the supply
chain and waste management systems. The statement of work
should therefore specify these goals and the contract itself
must provide a plan for exchanging necessary information.
Such exchange involves shared access to computer tracking
systems, transfer of management, operations and maintenance
responsibility, and a system of comparison to baseline definitions
of pre-existing conditions, including baseline costs, operating
conditions and system deficiencies. Entering into a contract
that specifies such clearly established performance goals
allows both parties to better understand their new rights
and obligations, and objectively to determine the success
or failure of CWMS.
In addition, the manufacturer may consider a method of
sharing economic benefits with the service provider by carefully
monitoring individual cost items comprising CWMS, establishing
minimum guarantied savings to meet the manufacturer’s
expectations. Beyond these minimum cost-savings, the service
provider can share in the economic benefits by “gainshare”
or other method of promoting cost savings. The sharing of
economic benefits resulting from CWMS can justify the allocation
of responsibility, risk and legal obligations incurred by
the service provider for the benefit of manufacturer. On
the other hand, manufacturer receives comfort from its ability
to terminate the contract and find a replacement service
provider in the event of contractor’s breach.
Labor Issues. With respect to
the transfer of employees from the manufacturer to the service
provider in CWMS, the first issue to consider is whether
the consent of a union or other collective bargaining unit
is required. If the transfer overlaps with union jobs, the
terms of collective bargaining need to be carefully reviewed
and factored into negotiations in the early stages of an
LOI and accounted for in drafting the RFP. A protracted
negotiation with a union over whether and how to transfer
employees to the service provider will also affect the overall
timing of CWMS. Regardless of the existence of a union at
the manufacturer’s site, however, any transfer of
personnel raises sensitive performance and morale issues
requiring careful attention from both manufacturer’s
and service provider’s human resources departments
early in the CWMS process. These labor issues usually involve
a myriad of local and national laws, including mandatory
notice periods and possibly a consultation process, all
affecting timing and terms of any proposed transfer.
In the United States, for example, the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (WARN Act) applies
directly to the transfer of employees on the federal level,
commonly triggered by CWMS. The WARN Act refers to plant
closings or mass lay-offs affecting the lesser of 50 employees
and one-third of the workforce. The purpose of the WARN
Act is to protect the workers through a mandatory 60 day
advance notice period imposed on the existing employer.
As a consequence, if the required advance notice is not
given to the employees, the new employer will be liable
to the affected employees for back pay and benefits. To
avoid WARN Act consequences in CWMS, service providers are
encouraged to offer employment to all affected employees
(often with signing bonuses) on substantially equivalent
terms as previously offered by the manufacturer. Concurrently,
the manufacturer should terminate all employees and pay-off
accrued vacation and personal time-off balances before effecting
a complete transfer. Additionally, all parties to a CWMS
contract under US law should represent and warrant to “at
will” employment status, while outside of the US,
the “at will” contract may not exist.
CONCLUSION
The benefits of CWMS are clearly achievable and the opportunity
is enhanced by proper contract drafting that understands
the objectives of supply chain management within the parameters
of realistic allocation of risk. The CWMS contract, if structured
correctly, provides for economic, environmental and social
benefits because the manufacturer and service provider have
developed a system for sharing information to permit a realistic
valuation of the transfer. To facilitate this process of
CWMS development, goals must be clearly defined by the manufacturer
and presented in a manner easily understood by and accessible
to the service provider. This allows for the proper assessment
and pricing response requested in the RFP. These goals,
expectations and limitations should then be documented through
the process of incremental CWMS contract formation, with
special attention to the proper allocation of risk and responsibility
for economic, social, employment and environmental impact.
Anders E. Stenstedt is a partner in the
firm’s global finance and infrastructure practice
group, located in the San Francisco office, with expertise
in international transactions, project development and finance
with emphasis on private sector participation (PSP) in public
infrastructure. In addition, Mr. Stenstedt has a range of
experience in complex structured finance and in evolving
areas of infrastructure development, project finance and
the private public partnership (PPP).
For more information on this article, please contact Anders
Stenstedt at (415) 268-6646 or anders@mofo.com.
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